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NEW CRISIS IN INDOCHINA

~r.

,.,resident: In the last few days there have been very diaturb·

ing reports on the situation in south VietNam.

For a time, the nationalist

government in Saigon appeared to be making some progrea 1 in consolidating
the non-communist poaition. Headed by Ngo Dien Diem, that government
had the full cooperation of the United States and the policies of the Mendes France cabinet in Paris were not unfavorable to ita stability and progress.
The Diem government made clear from the outset that it was
'

dedicated to the independence and welfare of the people of Viet Nam.
Because it was, it antagonized powerful forces, native and otherwile,
in Saigon.

Most of all it antagonized the Ho Chi-Minh forces in the north.

For the first time they found themselves confronted with an opposition
which had some chance of capturing the loyalties of the Viet Narnese
people which they had monopolized by default prior to its advent.
Now the picture has changed.

Press reports tell of deterioration

and loss of confidence once again in Saigon.
has

n~ver

The opposition to Diem which

ceased in underground conspiracy and sabotage to attempt to

overthrow him baa now come out in an open military action designed to
destroy his government.

There has already been considerable fighting and

bloodshed in the streets of Saigon.

- 2 Ae members of the Senate may recall, I have viaited Viet Nam
during the course of two study mbeions in Indochina and have reported
my observation• to the Committee on Foreign Relatione.

I have also

apoken on the situation in Indochina from time to time in thil body.
I have not been in Viet Narn eince laet September, and I do not
know the full detaile of the preeent crisis. I assume that the President
and the Secretary of State do have those detail• since they bear
reeponeibility for formulating and executing our policy with respect to
VietNam.
Recent news report• from Saigon a.nd elsewhere, however. do
give a general picture of what has been going on in south VietNam.

They

tell of French diseatt.faction with the Diem government and the bitter
animosity of various sects and other groups towards that government
becauae of its attempte to curt.ail their independent power and revenue.
The Diem government ie portrayed ae on the verge of overthrow, with its
P remier unable to consolidate hia authority in the country.
There is nothing new in that picture.

There ie nothing in it

which would lead me to revise the conclusions which I reached last year.

On October 15th, I reported those conclusion• to the Committee on Foreign
Relatione.

1 should like to re-emphasize them at thia time by reading

pertinent •ections:

- 3 A year ago, the principal requirements for the
success of our policy with respect to Indochina were political.
These requirements, full independence and effective internal
government, notably in Vietnam, have not been effectively
fulfilled. The failure in .thia respect appears abo to have been
accompanied by a consistent underestimating of both the political
and military strength of the Vietminh, on the part of practically
all concerned. In consequence, the situation bae aerioully
deteriorated.
The United States sharea reepon•ibility for the rever ..
sal in Indochina. We should not make the mhtake, however,
of assuming all the blame. We gave material aid unstintingly,
but its value waa dissipated by inadequaciea elsewhere. I
report this. not so much in criticism--! am fully aware of the
great contributions to the common cause made by sincere French
officials and sincere Vietnamese nationalists--but rather to make
clear that thia country has discharged the commitments which it
was asked to make last year and which it agreed to make. At
that time it was not asked to commit and was even discouraged
from committing manpower in Indochina. Not until the crbis
of Dien Bien Phu did the question even arise. Then the pressures of American opinion operating largely through Congress
disco uraged a hasty, ill-conceived involvement. Our share in
the defen•e o! Indochina was clearly understood at the outset to
be the supply of material aid only and we quite properly insisted
that this understanding be maintained. The situation in Indochina is·only one of the many crises that confront us and the
burden of sustaining free-dom in the world must be equitably
b orne.
At present, there appears to be. at beet, scant hope of
achieving the objectives of our policy in Indochina in the near
future, with Cambodia the only exception to this conclusion. The
present Government of Vietnam which i l based on the sound
principles of national independence, an end to corruption and
internal amelioration, ia immobilized largely by a squabbling
plotting opposition. Its critics complain of the personality of
the leader of that Government. In view of the numerou.s and
varied personalities who have occupied the Preddency in Saigon
during the past 2 or 3 years without tangible results, it aeeme
m ore likely that the re'l question ia one of dt.aatiafaction with
the principles of the Diem government rather than the inadequaciea of his per•onality.

- 4 Should the Diem government be forced out of office, it
ia doubtful that under the pressure of time a more aatie!actory,
substitute, subscribing to the same principles to which he does,
will be found. Yet these principles must prevail in south
Vietnam, if an alternative to the Communist Vi~tminh that ia
likely to be acceptable to the people of Vietnam h to exiet.
Any replacement of Diem at thie time, if it occurs, will
probably take the form of a military dictatorship baeed upon
a coalition of the special intereets, parties, and groups which
now oppo1e the preeent Government. It ia improbable that
the substitute will be the kind of government which will be
generally supported by the Vietname•e people any more than
the pre·Diem governments were. Nor is it likely to be a
government capable of sustaining a free and independent
Vietnam eventually without .foreign support. It was to develop
that kind of Vietnam that the United States made available
hundreds of millions of dollars of aid • .In my view, only that
kind of Vietnam can achieve the purpose of our policy in
Indochina which, in the final analysis, is its freedom and the
coneequent enhancement of our own eecurity.

In the event that the Diem government falls, therefore,
I believe that the United States should contider an immediate
sus pen•ion of all aid to Vietnam and the French Union forces
there, except that of a humanitarian nature, preliminary to a
complete reappraisal of our :present polieiee in Free Vietnam.
Unless there is reasona~ble expectation of fulfilling our objectives th~ continued expenditure of the resou.rces of the citiz-3ns
of the United States ia unwarranted and inexcusable.
Two parts of those conclusions should be underlined in connection
with the present cris.i.t.

They bear directly on it.

1. Should the Diem government be forced out of office, it ie
doubtful that under the pressure of time a more eatiefactory
8\lbstitute eubecribing to the same principle• which he does,
will be found. Yet those principles must prevail in south
Vietnam, if an alternative tu the Communist Vietmlnh that
is likely to be acceptable to the people of Vietnam is to exist.

and

..
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Z. In the event that the Diem Government falls, I believe
that the United States should consider an immediate Ius pension of all aid to Vietnam and the Fl'ench Union forces
there, except that of a humanitarian nature, preliminary to
a complete reappraisal of our present policies in Free
Vietnan1.
A r.ho :vdown in Slligon is now in progreee.
are side issl.les in thil str\lggle.

I know that there

I know that it ha• been contended and

perhap1 correctly that Diem i8 too uncompromiting in his dealings with
other leaders.

Basically, however, the 1howdown is between two set1

of forces in Viet Nam.

The one, presently personified by Diem, •tanda

for a decent and honest government in an independent Viet Nam .

Aliped

against it are those 111ho have little concept of, little concern or downright contempt for what these terms mean .

Diem has recently expt'eaaed

hb intention o! holding elections ae a first 1tep towards t'epresentative

government.

' ho opposes these elections? Thole, apparently, whose

power is net based on the consent of the people over whom it is exercised.
The opponents of the Diem government have power but it is a power built

largely on corruption and

th~

fear that their private armed forces inspire .

It i• the power of the Black Hand and the witch doctor.

If the !orces standing !or decency and hone•ty and genuine
national independence !&it in this crisis, the cause of human freedorp in
Asia will not gain.
really gain.

This co\lntry will not gain.

The Frf:nch will not

Even those Vietnamese who help to bring about the do'Wl'lfall of

the government, in the long run. will not gain.

Cnly the Communiats will gain.

- 6 It is possible that a. se rnblance of stability m ay be prc;duced in

Saigon if a coalition of the corrupt replaces the present government.
Beneath the •urface, however, the penetration of communism will go
on rapidly and inevitably.
My view of the present crisis remains a.s 1 expressed it in the

conclusions of the report which I read today.

Current developments 1eem

to me only to emphasize the pertinence o! those conclusions.
If is posdble that the Executive Branch has inforrr;ation on the

situation itl south Viet Nam going far beyond that which is currently
ap~earing

in the prets.

It m ay he that General Collins' report to the

President and the Secretary of State will add important elements to the
present picture. It may be that in time this body will be advised of facta
which we do not n ow have.

1t may be that the President and the Secretary

of State will have to alter the p!"¢Sent direction of our policy away from

8\lpport ol the Diem Government in VietNam .

That is entirely possible

and, if it is the case, it certainly lies within the:ir responsibility to make
the neces &ary adjuatluents.

However. if this government is to align itaelf

with the kind of forces which are now in opposition to Diem, if it is to
spend hundreds of millions of dollars in support of those forces, I believe
the America.n people will expect a clearcut explanation.
expect an explanation which will •how how such
the national intere•t• of thil country.

I believe they will

exp:enditur~a

contribute to

It will be the responsibility of the

CE)naress and especially of this body to see that they get it.

~

....

f
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1 should like to append to my remakra several newapaper excerpt•

which describe in far more graphic terms than I could hope to do the
fantaatic nature oi the fo.rcea which ·o ppoee Diem .

Theae are the force•

that are being talked of in some quarter• a• hia loaical replacement.
This ie the base on which our aid ia auppoaed to build a atrong a nticommunist bulwark in touth VietNam.

